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Abstract. Typical voting rules do not work well in settings with many
candidates. If there are just several hundred candidates, then even a
simple task such as choosing a top candidate becomes impractical. Mo-
tivated by the hope of developing group consensus mechanisms over the
internet, where the numbers of candidates could easily number in the
thousands, we study an urn-based voting rule where each participant
acts as a voter and a candidate. We prove that when participants lie
in a one-dimensional space, this voting protocol finds a (1 − ǫ/√n) ap-
proximation of the Condorcet winner with high probability while only
requiring an expected O( 1
ǫ2
log2 n
ǫ2
) comparisons on average per voter.
Moreover, this voting protocol is shown to have a quasi-truthful Nash
equilibrium: namely, a Nash equilibrium exists which may not be truth-
ful, but produces a winner with the same probability distribution as that
of the truthful strategy.
1 Introduction
Voting is often used as a method for achieving consensus among a group of
individuals. This may happen, for example, when a committee chooses a rep-
resentative or friends go out to watch a movie. When the group is small, this
process is relatively easy; however, for larger groups, the typical requirement of
ranking all candidates becomes impractical and heuristics are often applied to
narrow down opinions to a few representative ones before a vote is taken.
This problem of large-scale preference aggregation is even more interesting
in light of the rising potential of crowdsourcing. Suppose that a city government
wanted to ask its constituencies to contribute solutions for an “ideal budget
that cuts 50 percent of the deficit”.1 Soliciting such proposals may be rela-
tively straightforward; however, it is not clear how these proposals should be
aggregated. In particular, a participant cannot even look through each proposal,
making seemingly simple tasks such as choosing top ranked proposals, difficult.
A solution to this problem would enable a new level of collaboration, a key step
towards unleashing the full potential of crowdsourcing.
In this paper, we propose a randomized voting rule designed for scenarios
like the above. In our problem setting, each participant submits exactly one
proposal, representing his or her stance on the question of interest. A random
1 See, for example, widescope.stanford.edu, aimed at tackling the federal budget deficit
triad of participants is then selected and each selected member is made to vote
between the other two. Roughly speaking (details are elaborated in Sect. 2.1),
if there is a three-way tie, the participants are thrown out from the election;
otherwise, the losers are replaced by ‘copies’ of the winner. This is then repeated
until there is a single participant remaining, who is declared the winner.
We show that for single peaked preferences, Triadic Consensus converges ap-
proximately to the Condorcet winner2 with high probability, while only requiring
an average of ∼ log2 n (conjectured to be ∼ logn) comparisons per individual. As
an illustration, recall our motivating scenario of a city government crowdsourcing
a question to its constituencies. Suppose that the city finds ten thousand par-
ticipants and that the participant preferences are single-peaked. Clearly, looking
through all 10000 proposals to perform the simple task of voting for a favorite is
impossible. With Triadic Consensus, each participant would make an average of
177 (conjectured to be 13.3) pairwise comparisons for the algorithm to produce a
winner. This winner would be between proposals 4950 and 5050 with 95 percent
probability and between proposals 4900 and 5100 with 99.99 percent probability.
In other words, the winner would be in the top 1 percent of submitted proposals
with 95 percent probability and in the top 2 percent of submitted proposals with
99.99 percent probability.
In addition, we show that Triadic Consensus has nice properties for protect-
ing against manipulation. Suppose that the rankings of candidates are induced
from an underlying distance metric and suppose that each candidate has a con-
cave utility in that distance. Then Triadic Consensus has a quasi-truthful Nash
equilibrium. Specifically, (see Sect. 2.2) a Nash equilibrium exists which may not
be truthful, but still chooses a winner with the same probability distribution as if
every participant voted truthfully. Surprisingly, we achieve this result by coun-
terintuitively allowing voters to express cyclical preferences (e.g. a > b, b > c,
and c > a).
1.1 Related Work and Our Contributions
Given the long history of work on voting theory, it is not surprising that the
problems we tackle have been, for the most part, thought about before. Here, we
give a brief overview of related work, followed by a summary of our contributions.
For in-depth reading, we refer the reader to Brandt et al. [1].
Voting rule criteria One of the earliest criteria introduced for evaluating
voting rules is known as the Condorcet criteria, introduced by Marquis de Con-
dorcet3. It states that if a candidate exists who would win against every other
candidate in a majority election, then this candidate should be elected. Unfor-
tunately, such a candidate does not always exist. Since then, many other criteria
2 The candidate who would beat any other candidate in a pairwise majority election.
In single dimensional spaces, this happens to be the median participant.
3 See Young [2] for a fascinating historical description of the early work of Condorcet.
have been introduced as ways to evaluate voting rules. However, in the surpris-
ing result known as Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem, Arrow [3] proved that there
were three desirable criterion that no deterministic voting rule could satisfy. This
was expanded by Pattanaik and Peleg [4] to show that a similar result holds for
probabilistic voting rules.
Strategic manipulation This sparked a wave of impossibility results, includ-
ing the classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite Impossibility Theorem. Define a voting
rule to be strategy-proof if it is always in a voter’s interest to submit his true pref-
erence, regardless of the other voter rankings. Gibbard [5] and Satterthwaite [6]
independently showed that all deterministic, strategy-proof voting rules must ei-
ther be dictatorships or never allow certain candidates to win. This was extended
to show that only very simple probabilistic voting rules were strategy-proof[7].
Numerous attempts at circumventing these impossibility result have been
made. Bartholdi et al. [8] first proposed using computational hardness as a bar-
rier against manipulation in elections. However, despite many NP-hardness re-
sults on manipulation of voting rules[9], it was shown that there do not exist
any voting rules that are usually hard to manipulate[10].
Procaccia [11] used the simple probabilistic voting rules of Gibbard [7] to ap-
proximate common voting rules in a strategy-proof way, but the approximations
are weak and they show that, for many of these voting rules, no strategy-proof
approximations can be much stronger. Birrell and Pass [12] extended this idea to
approximately strategy-proof voting, proving that there exist tight approxima-
tions of any voting rule that are close to strategy-proof. Recently, Alon et al. [?]
studied the special case of approval voting when voters and candidates coincide.
They show that even though no deterministic strategy-proof mechanism has a
finite approximation ratio, a randomized strategy-proof mechanism exists which
has a good approximation ratio.
Communication complexity When the number of candidates is large, it is
important to study voting rules from the perspective of the burden on voters.
Conitzer and Sandholm [13] studied the worst case number of bits that vot-
ers need to communicate (e.g. pairwise comparisons) in order to determine the
ranking or winner of common voting rules; for many of these voting rules, it
was shown that the number of bits required is essentially the same as what is
required for reporting the entire ranking. In addition, they showed [14] that for
many common voting rules, determining how to elicit preferences efficiently is
NP-complete, even when perfect knowledge about voter preferences is assumed.
Lu and Boutilier [15] proposed the idea of reducing communication complexity
under approximate winner determination. Though they do not present theoreti-
cal guarantees, they propose a regret minimizing algorithm and show significant
reductions in communication when run on experimental data sets.
Single-peaked preferences One special case that avoids the many discour-
aging results above is that of single-peaked preferences[16] (or other domain
restrictions). Single-peaked preferences are those for which candidates can be
described as lying on a line. Every voter’s utility function is peaked at one can-
didate and drops off on either side. For such preferences, a Condorcet winner
always exists and is the candidate who is the median of all voter peaks. This
winner can be found by the classical median voting rule, which has each voter
state their peak and returns the median of these peaks. It turns out that the
median voting rule is both strategy-proof[17] and has a low communication com-
plexity of O(n logm)[18], where n is the number of voters and m is the number
of candidates. Conitzer [19] also studies the problem of eliciting voter preferences
or the aggregate ranking using comparison queries.
The median voting rule has one weakness: it requires knowledge of an axis,
which can make it impractical in practice. First, the algorithm requires knowl-
edge of the axis in order to pick the median of peaks. When an axis isn’t known,
Escoffier et al. [18] provides an O(mn) algorithm for finding such an axis with ad-
ditional queries, but with no strategic guarantees. Second, the voter also requires
knowledge of the axis. In situations where proposals have multiple criterion, but
are still single peaked (for example, in a linear combination of the criterion),
it may not be obvious to the voter where the axis is. Third, and more subtle,
even if an axis is known, it may not be practical to express a voter’s position
on this axis. Take, for example, the canonical liberal-conservative axis used to
support the single-peaked setting. It is obvious that one extreme of the axis is an
absolute liberal and that the other is an absolute conservative. But how would
a voter express any position in between? It would not make sense for a voter to
express his or her peak as “seventy percent liberal”.4
Our contributions Triadic Consensus solves the previous problems by elimi-
nating the need for an axis. The only task voters are required to perform is a
series of comparisons between two candidates. Likewise, the central algorithm
does not require any knowledge about proposal positions. With these properties,
we prove the following guarantees (as made precise in Sects. 3 and 4):
1. For single-peaked preferences, Triadic Consensus finds a (1− ǫ/√n) approxi-
mation of the Condorcet winner with high probability with a communication
complexity of O( nǫ2 log
2 n
ǫ2 ), i.e. ∼ n log2 n (conjectured to be ∼ n logn) for
a 1− 1√
n
approximation and ∼ 1ǫ2 log2 1ǫ2 for a 1− ǫ approximation.
2. For a single-dimensional setting, Triadic Consensus has a quasi-truthful Nash
equilibrium when participants have concave utility functions.
These results are especially interesting given that they are coupled with the
following novel concepts:
1. A localized consensus mechanism for large groups. We propose Triadic Con-
sensus as an approach for large groups to make decisions using small decen-
tralized decisions among groups of three.
4 Note that he cannot just state his favorite candidate as his peak because this would
require looking through all n candidates.
2. Quasi-truthful voting rules and cyclical preferences. When each participant is
a voter and a candidate, we demonstrate that allowing participants to express
cyclical preferences (a > b, b > c, and c > a) can introduce strategies that
detect and protect against strategic manipulation.
Outline of the paper Before continuing, we describe the structure of the
remaining sections. In Sect. 2, we detail Triadic Consensus and introduce the
notion of quasi-truthfulness. This is followed by Sect. 3, which presents the ap-
proximation and communication complexity results, and Sect. 4, which describes
the quasi-truthfulness results. Finally, Sect. 5 concludes with future directions.
2 Triadic Consensus and Quasi-truthfulness
2.1 Triadic Consensus
ALGORITHM 1: Triadic Consensus
Input: An urn with k labeled balls for each participant 1, 2, . . . , n
Output: A winning candidate i.
while there is more than one label do
Sample three balls (with labels x, y, z) uniformly at random with replacement;
w = TriadicVote(x, y, z);
if w 6= ∅ then
Relabel all the sampled balls with the winning label w;
else
/* For example, remove the three sampled balls from the urn */
TriadicMechanism(x, y, z);
if at least one ball remains then
return the id of any remaining ball;
else
return the id of a random ball from the last removed;
ALGORITHM 2: TriadicVote
Input: Candidates x, y, z
Output: One of {x, y, z} if there is a winner, ∅ otherwise
if two of more of x, y, z have the same id then
return the majority candidate;
x votes between y and z; y votes between x and z; z votes between x and y;
if each received exactly one vote then
return ∅;
else
return the candidate with two votes;
Triadic Consensus applies to scenarios where the set of candidates and voters
coincide. We use x to refer to both the participant x and the candidate solution
ALGORITHM 3: The Remove mechanism
Input: Balls x, y, and z
Remove the three sampled balls from the urn;
ALGORITHM 4: The RepeatThenRemove mechanism
Input: Balls x, y, and z
w = TriadicVote(x, y, z);
if w 6= ∅ then
Relabel all the sampled balls with the winning label w;
else
Remove(x, y, z);
that he or she proposes. For x, y, z ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, we use ≻x to denote the
ranking of participant x and y ≻x z to denote that x prefers y over z.5
The best way to understand Triadic Consensus (Alg. 1) is to imagine an urn
with balls, each of which is labeled by a participant id. The urn starts with k
balls for each of the n participants.6 At each step, the algorithm samples three
balls uniformly at random (with replacement) and performs a TriadicVote (Alg.
2) on the three corresponding participants.
If the three participants x, y, and z are unique, the TriadicVote subroutine
consists of a single comparison for each of the selected participants: x votes
between y and z, y between x and z, and z between x and y. These votes can
be distributed in some permutation of 2, 1, 0 or split 1, 1, 1. In the first case, the
participant who received two votes is returned as the winner. In the second case,
a tie (represented as ∅) is returned. If two or more of the selected ids are the
same, i.e. are the same person, then he is automatically returned as the winner.
If a winner was returned from the TriadicVote, then the three balls are re-
labeled with the winning id and placed back into the urn; otherwise, one of
several mechanisms can be applied to resolve the tie. This process is repeated
until there is only one participant id remaining, which is declared the winner. A
helpful intuition is that the mechanism implemented in the case of a tie can be
thought of as a deterrent for manipulation since a three-way tie can never occur
if participants are voting truthfully (see Sect. 2.2).
In our paper, we propose two possible mechanisms, each of which has a quasi-
truthful Nash equilibrium. The simplest is Remove (Alg. 3), in which the three
balls are simply removed. In RepeatThenRemove (Alg. 4), the three balls are
made to vote again; if there is another three way tie, then they are removed.
Surprisingly, repeating the TriadicVote before elimination results in a simpler
(and more practical) strategy that is a quasi-truthful Nash equilibrium.
5 We assume a strict ordering, but it is not hard to generalize the algorithm to ties.
6 The intuition for k is that it is a tradeoff between approximation and time. Increasing
k makes the approximation tighter, but requires more comparisons to converge.
2.2 Truthfulness and Quasi-truthfulness
For our analysis of strategic behavior, we will assume that each individual is
represented as a point x in some space X and that his or her preference ranking
is induced by a distance metric d(x, ·) on X . If d(x, y) ≤ d(x, z), then y ≻x z;
that is, x prefers proposals that are closer to him. Since the individuals voting
in a TriadicVote are also the candidates being voted for, there can never be
a three-way tie in a truthful vote. Otherwise, all three of d(x, y) < d(x, z),
d(y, z) < d(y, x), and d(z, x) < d(z, y) must be simultaneously true, which is
impossible so long as d(·, ·) satisfies the natural property that d(x, y) = d(y, x).7
Consider a TriadicVote between participants x, y, and z. If they vote truth-
fully, then there are situations when players may be incentivized to deviate as
in Ex. 1.
Example 1. Four participants lie in space X = R at positions 0, 5, 6, and 7.
Suppose participants 0, 5, and 7 are selected for a TriadicVote. Since they are
voting truthfully, 0 votes for 5, 5 votes for 7, and 7 votes for 5. As a result, 5
wins and the resulting urn consists of three balls for 5 and one for 6.
Now suppose participant 7 were to vote strategically for participant 0. This
would result in a tie and all the selected balls would be eliminated, leaving only
participant 6. Clearly, participant 7 would prefer this second situation.
At this point, we might note that the truthful winner’s vote (e.g. 5) does
not change the result and that he can use his vote to disincentivize others from
manipulating the TriadicVote. We define any such behavior to be quasi-truthful
when it results in the same outcome as that of truthful voting.
Example 2. Suppose that the participants of Ex. 1 are trying to minimize the
expected distance of the winning proposal to their position. Then a quasi-truthful
strategy would be for 0 to vote for 5, 5 to vote for 0 and 7 to vote for 5. As in
Ex. 1, 5 wins and the resulting urn consists of three balls for 5 and one for 6.
Now suppose participant 7 deviates from this strategy and votes for 0. Then
participant 0 gets two votes and he wins. The resulting urn consists of three balls
for 0 and one for 6, which is clearly worse for participant 7. Likewise, suppose
participant 0 deviates from this strategy and votes for 7. Then there is a three-
way tie and all selected balls get eliminated. The resulting urn consists of a single
ball for 6, which is clearly worse for participant 0.
From this example, we get the intuition for Alg. 5, a quasi-truthful Nash for
the Remove mechanism. If a participant (y WLOG) is the truthful winner, then
he should look for the participant who would prefer a win for him over a removal
of all three balls (x WLOG). Then if y votes for x, this will disincentivize x from
deviating. Since z can only cause x to win by deviating, it seems intuitively
bad for him to deviate since the winner will be strictly farther. If all players
7 If voter rankings allow ties, then a three-way tie could be truthful. In this case, a
simple generalization of the TriadicVote that aligns with the intuition of punishing
manipulation could be used.
ALGORITHM 5: Quasi-truthful Nash for the Remove mechanism
Input: Voter x, candidates y, z
Output: One of {y, z}
if x thinks he should win then
if y would prefer a win for x rather than a three-way tie in a truthful world then
return y;
else
return z;
else
return a truthful comparison between y and z;
ALGORITHM 6: Quasi-truthful Nash for the RepeatThenRemove mechanism
Input: Voter x, candidates y, z
Output: One of {y, z}
if x thinks he should win then
if it is the first TriadicVote then
/* For example, a truthful comparison */
return either of y or z;
else
return the candidate that he didn’t vote for in the first round;
else
return a truthful comparison between y and z;
have concave utilities, it turns out that there always must be a participant that
prefers y to win over a removal of all three balls. This intuition is translated into
a rigorous proof in Sect. 4.
The same idea gives us Alg. 6, a quasi-truthful Nash for the RepeatThenRe-
move mechanism and a more practical strategy to implement. In this strategy,
x simply chooses an arbitrary participant to vote for first; if there is a tie, he
should then switch his vote. It turns out that the proof structure for this is
almost identical to that of Alg. 5. If y happens to vote for x in the first round,
then he is safe according to the reasoning of Alg. 5. However, if y happens to
vote for z, the only thing z can do is to cause a repeat vote, during which y will
vote for x, bringing us back to the realm of Alg. 5’s strategy.
3 Triadic Consensus approximates the Condorcet winner
with low communication complexity
3.1 Background: Fixed size urns and urn functions
The primary idea in proving the results in this section is to reduce the Triadic
Consensus urn to previously known results for fixed size urns with urn functions.
A fixed size urn contains some number of balls, which are each colored either red
or blue. Let Rt and Bt be the number of red and blue balls respectively at time
t, where Rt+Bt = n. Also, let pt =
Rt
n denote the fraction of red balls. At every
discrete time t, either a red ball is sampled with probability f(pt), a blue ball
is sampled with probability f(1 − pt), or nothing happens with the remaining
probability. The function f : [0, 1]→ [0, 1] is called an urn function and satisfies
0 ≤ f(x)+ f(1−x) ≤ 1 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1. If a ball was sampled, it is then recolored
to the opposite color and placed back into the urn. This process repeats until
some time T when all the balls are the same color, i.e. RT = n or RT = 0.
We will show in the following section that Triadic Consensus is closely related
to fixed size urns with urn function f(p) = 3p(1 − p)2. We will then use the
following theorems derived from those in Lee and Bruck [20]8.
Theorem 1. Let a fixed size urn start with R0 red balls out of n total balls and
have an urn function f(p) = 3p(1− p)2. Let T denote the first time when either
RT = n or RT = 0. Then,
Pr[RT = n] =
(
1
2
)n−1 R0∑
j=1
(
n− 1
j − 1
)
Theorem 2. Let a fixed size urn start with R0 red balls out of n total balls and
have an urn function f(p) = 3p(1− p)2. Let T denote the first time when either
RT = n or RT = 0. Then,
E[T ] ≤ n lnn+O(n)
3.2 Reduction from Triadic Consensus to fixed size urns
Recall that our results are for the case of single-peaked preferences, for which the
candidates can be said to lie on some axis. Every voter’s utility is described by a
peak on that axis which falls off on either direction. Without loss of generality,
we let the participant ids be labeled from one end of the axis to the other, i.e.
1 < 2 < . . . < n.
Lemma 1. Let x, y, and z be three unique participants whose peaks lie on an
axis such that x < y < z. Then the winner of a quasi-truthful TriadicVote(x, y,
z) must be the median participant y.
Proof. Since y would win in a truthful vote, this follows from the definition of
quasi-truthfulness. ⊓⊔
Lemma 2. For single-peaked preferences, let the participant ids be labeled from
one end of the axis to the other, i.e. 1 < 2 < . . . < n. Color balls with ids
1, 2, . . . , i red and balls with ids i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . , n blue. Then if participants vote
quasi-truthfully, Triadic Consensus (for k = 1) will produce a red winner with the
same probability as that of a fixed size urn with urn function f(p) = 3p(1− p)2.
8 Theorem 2 requires some algebra that may not be immediately clear from the general
theorem stated in the reference. For the convenience of the reader, we include these
calculations in Appendix B.
Proof. Let pr and pb denote the fraction of red and blue balls respectively. Each
time three balls are sampled, the median ball must win by Lemma 1, which
implies that the majority color must win. Then we have the following four cases:
Three red With probability p3r, there is no change in colors.
Two red, one blue With probability 3p2rpb, one blue ball is recolored red.
One red, two blue With probability 3prp
2
b , one red ball is recolored blue.
Three blue With probability p3b , there is no change in colors.
These are the transition probabilities for a fixed size urn with i red balls, n− i
blue balls, and urn function f(p) = 3p(1−p)2. Since every transition probability
is identical, the final probability of a red winner must be identical. ⊓⊔
3.3 Main results
Theorem 3. For single-peaked preferences, let the participant ids be labeled from
one end of the axis to the other, i.e. 1 < 2 < . . . < n. Then if participants vote
quasi-truthfully, Triadic Consensus (for k = 1) will produce a winner w with
probability
Pr[w = i] =
(
1
2
)n−1(
n− 1
i− 1
)
Proof. If balls 1, 2, . . . , i are colored red, then w ≤ i iff the winning ball is red.
Then applying Theorem 1 and Lemma 2, we get Pr[w ≤ i]. By subtracting
Pr[w ≤ i− 1] from Pr[w ≤ i], we get our final expression. ⊓⊔
A similar argument extends the above theorem for general k. Using standard
probabilistic arguments[21], we get the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let there be n single-peaked participants and let w denote the win-
ning id after running Triadic Consensus with k = O( 1ǫ2 log
1
δ ). Then assuming
that participants vote quasi-truthfully, w will be a (1 − ǫ/√n) approximation of
the Condorcet winner with probability at least 1− δ.
Theorem 4. For single-peaked preferences and quasi-truthful voting, Triadic
Consensus has a total communication complexity of O(kn log2(kn)).
Proof. Theorem 2 is an upper bound on the expected time it takes to halve the
number of remaining participants (since we can color half the participants red
and half blue). For kn balls, this gives us less than or equal to kn ln(kn)+O(kn)
expected time to halve the participants. Each time the urn converges to a single
color, we can recolor half the remaining participants and repeat. After logn
rounds, we will be done. ⊓⊔
The above theorem is an upper bound on the communication complexity.
In reality, at each recoloring, the balls will not be split evenly between the two
colors. Based on this intuition and simulations, we conjecture that the commu-
nication complexity is only O(kn log kn).
Conjecture 1. For single-peaked preferences and quasi-truthful voting, Triadic
Consensus has a total communication complexity of O(kn log kn).
3.4 How bad is O(
√
n) error?
We would like to point out that for crowdsourcing applications, participants can
often be viewed as noisy samples from some underlying distribution. Because of
this, even if we were to find the exact Condorcet winner of the noisy sample,
this may not significantly improve the variance.
For example, suppose that the participants are drawn independently and uni-
formly from [0, 1] so that the true Condorcet candidate would be one in position
1
2 . Now suppose that
1
2 lies between the k-th and k + 1-th sampled participant.
Then k is clearly binomially distributed, which is the same distribution as the
case of Triadic Consensus. In other words, the exact Condorcet winner of the
sampled participants has a standard deviation of 12
√
n participants between him
and the true Condorcet winner of the underlying distribution. Since the approx-
imate Condorcet winner produced by Triadic Consensus also O(
√
n) standard
deviation, they have the same order of error.
3.5 Triadic Consensus eliminates outliers quickly
Triadic Consensus has the intuition of quickly eliminating outliers since each
participant needs to convince two other participants to vote for him in order to
win. We will give two observations supporting this intuition. First, we consider
two seemingly powerful algorithms that have access to side information that
allows them to directly eliminate outliers in various ways. Despite their use of this
knowledge, they choose a winner with the exact same probability distribution
as that of Triadic Consensus. Second, we compare Triadic Consensus to a non-
Triadic random sampling algorithm and show that Triadic Consensus does much
better at picking a central candidate for each round.
Two seemingly powerful algorithms Consider algorithms RemoveRandomEx-
treme (Alg. 7) and ContractExtremes (Alg. 8). Each of these algorithms assume
a set of participants which have single-peaked preferences and have some lim-
ited access to the two extremes (the participants with the leftmost and rightmost
peaks). In RemoveRandomExtreme, one of the two extreme balls is randomly
chosen and thrown out. In ContractExtremes, a random ball is chosen, and both
of the extreme balls are moved to this chosen ball. We show that they choose a
winner with the same probability distribution as that of Triadic Consensus.
Theorem 5. For single-peaked preferences, let the participant ids be labeled from
one end of the axis to the other, i.e. 1 < 2 < . . . < n. Then RemoveRandomEx-
treme and ContractExtremes will produce a winner w with probability
Pr[w = i] =
(
1
2
)n−1(
n− 1
i− 1
)
Proof. We use the same coloring technique as that of the proof for Lemma 2
ALGORITHM 7: RemoveRandomExtreme
Input: An urn with a ball for each participant 1, 2, . . . , n, each of whom lie on an axis
Output: A winning candidate i.
while there is more than one label do
Randomly sample one of the two (left or right) extreme balls;
Toss out the sampled ball;
return remaining label;
ALGORITHM 8: ContractExtremes
Input: An urn with a ball for each participant 1, 2, . . . , n, each of whom lie on an axis
Output: A winning candidate i.
while there is more than one label do
Randomly sample one candidate;
Move both of the two (left and right) extreme balls to the sampled ball;
return remaining label;
Hot-or-Not Consensus Consider Hot-or-Not Consensus, in which two balls
are randomly chosen as candidates and one single ball is randomly chosen as the
voter. The voter then votes between the two chosen balls and the two candidate
balls are replaced with the winning candidate. We do a one-step comparison of
these two algorithms given a continuous distribution of participants. It turns out
that the naive Hot-or-Not Consensus can be thought of as a mix between Triadic
Consensus and the (really bad) method of randomly picking a candidate.9
Theorem 6. Let a continuous distribution of voters be uniformly distributed
between zero and one. Let gHot-or-Not(x) and gTriadic(x) be the probability density
of x being the next winning candidate in Hot-or-Not and Triadic Consensus
respectively. Then, gTriadic = 6x(1 − x) and gHot-or-Not = 3x(1 − x) + 12 . In
particular,
gHot-or-Not =
1
2
gTriadic +
1
2
gUnif
where gUnif is the uniform distribution over the interval [0, 1].
Proof. For uniformly distributed participants, we have the density function f(x) =
1 and cumulative density function F (x) = x. In Triadic Consensus, x wins if he
is selected along with a candidate to the left and right of him. Then, we have
gTriadic(x) = 3!f(x)F (x)(1 − F (x)) = 6x(1− x)
9 This is only an intuition based on a one-step comparison and should not be inter-
preted as a comparison of their final approximation values.
In Hot-or-Not Consensus, x wins against y only if the voter z is closer to x than
y. Then,
gHot-or-Not(x) = 2f(x)
∫ x
0
f(y)
(
1− F
(
x+ y
2
))
dy + 2f(x)
∫ 1
x
f(y)F
(
x+ y
2
)
dy
= 2
[∫ x
0
(
1− x+ y
2
)
dx+
∫ 1
x
(
x+ y
2
)
dx
]
= 3x(1− x) + 1
2
3.6 Simulations in general spaces show promise
Even though our approximation and communication complexity results only hold
for single-peaked preferences, we believe that Triadic Consensus has strong prop-
erties for more complex spaces. To demonstrate this, we consider two classes of
preferences that are induced by points in a two dimensional Euclidean space. In
each of these cases, the rankings are clearly not single-peaked, but simulations
show strong results for both the approximation and the communication com-
plexity. The first example is a straightforward generalization to points that are
laid out in a grid.
Example 3. n = m2 voters are placed on the points (0, 0), (0, 1), . . . , (m−1,m−1)
to form a m ×m grid. The Condorcet winner in this scenario is at the median
point (m2 ,
m
2 ). From the simulation results below, we can see that Triadic Con-
sensus picks winners that are closely distributed around the winner. The average
number of votes each voter casts is ∼ O(log n).
mean winner σ of winner mean votes/voter σ of votes/voter
5x5 (1.96, 1.97) .953 1.966 0.425
10x10 (4.45, 4.5) 1.157 3.405 0.517
20x20 (9.61, 9.47) 1.236 4.618 0.417
40x40 (19.64, 19.53) 1.594 6.056 0.368
80x80 (39.57, 39.69) 1.555 7.293 0.324
Table 1: Simulation results for 100 iterations of Triadic Consensus on a grid
In the second case, we try to design a difficult scenario by densely populating the
perimeter of a circle and adding a single point at its center, who is the Condorcet
winner.
Example 4. n voters are placed uniformly around a circle (in the plane) with
radius 1 and centered at (0, 0). A single voter is placed at the point (0, 0).
The Condorcet winner in this scenario is the point (0, 0). Surprisingly, we find
that even as the number of points increases on the perimeter, the probability
of the randomized algorithm selecting the single Condorcet winner still remains
non-trivial. If this probability does remain above some constant, then we can
use standard probabilistic methods to show that repeating Triadic Consensus
a small number of times and picking the majority winner will result in (0, 0)
with arbitrarily high accuracy. The average number of votes each voter casts is
∼ O(log n).
% times (0,0) wins mean votes/voter σ of votes/voter
25 0.368 2.225 0.513
100 0.338 4.189 0.775
400 0.305 6.628 1.185
1600 0.295 9.224 1.696
6400 0.302 11.764 2.321
Table 2: Simulation results for 1000 iterations of Triadic Consensus on a circle
with a single point in the center
4 Triadic Consensus has a quasi-truthful Nash
equilibrium for concave utilities
To discuss strategic behavior, we need to define the utilities for each participant.
Let Ux(y) denote the utility that x gets from a proposal y. The utility x derives
from y depends on the distance from x to y, i.e. Ux(y) = fx(d(x, y)), where f(·)
must be decreasing in distance so that Ux(y) > Ux(z) whenever y ≻x z. We say
that a participant x has a concave utility function if fx(·) is a concave function.
Theorem 7. If all participants have concave utility functions, then Algs. 5 and 6
are quasi-truthful Nash equilibria for Triadic Consensus when using the Remove
and RepeatThenRemove mechanisms respectively.
Proof. We prove our main result with the following proof by induction. Since
the proofs for the Remove mechanism and the RepeatThenRemove mechanism
are almost identical (see 2.2), we will refer solely to the Remove mechanism for
simplicity.
Base Case: Alg. 5 is a Nash equilibrium for n = 1, 2, 3 balls (Lemma 3).
Inductive Step: Assume that Alg. 5 is a Nash equilibrium for n − 3 balls. Now
consider a participant x who is considering deviating from Alg. 5 in an urn with
n balls:
1. For any TriadicVote with participants x < y < z in an urn with n balls, if
y votes for x, then by the definition of the strategy and the fact that one of
x and z must prefer y to a three-way tie (Lemma 4), we know that x must
prefer y to win over a three-way tie, which means x should not deviate.
2. For any TriadicVote with participants x < y < z in an urn with n balls, if
y votes for z, then given that the previous statement is true, we show that
x should prefer a win for y over a win for z (Lemma 5). This is done by
defining a comparison relation between urns that formalizes this intuition
that participants should prefer closer balls. With this definition, we can
define a coupling of two urns: one in which x plays an optimal strategy, and
one in which x always plays according to Alg. 5. We show that for every
coupled history, the urn from Alg. 5 does at least as well as the optimal urn
in expected utility. This means that Alg. 5 is also an optimal strategy for x
in this case.
By carrying out the Inductive Hypothesis, we get our result for all n. ⊓⊔
4.1 Supporting Lemmas
Lemma 3. Alg. 5 is a Nash equilibrium for Triadic Consensus with the Remove
mechanism when n = 1, 2, or 3 balls.
Proof. This is trivially true for n = 1 and 2 since no votes take place. For
n = 3, suppose that the three participants are x < y < z. In this case, the only
situation when participants cast votes is when TriadicVote is performed with all
three unique participants. After such a situation occurs, there will either be a
winner or all balls will be eliminated and no further votes take place. Therefore,
our analysis can be constrained to this single TriadicVote.
If participants vote according to Alg. 5, we know that y will be the winner
since x and z both vote for him. Suppose y votes for xWLOG. Then if z deviates,
x will win, which is clearly suboptimal. If x deviates, then there is a three-way
tie and all are eliminated, resulting in a uniformly random winner.
The difference in utility lost for x by deviating is ∆Ux = Ux(y)− 13 (Ux(x) +
Ux(y) +Ux(z)). Letting d1 be the distance between x and y and d2 the distance
between y and z, we have ∆Ux =
1
3 (fx(d1) − fx(0)) − 13 (fx(d1 + d2) − fx(d1))
and
∆Ux ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ fx(d1)− fx(0) ≥ fx(d1 + d2)− fx(d1)
⇐⇒ fx(d1)− fx(0)
fx(d1 + d2)− fx(d1) ≤ 1
Similarly,
∆Uz ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ fz(d2)− fz(0)
fz(d1 + d2)− fz(d2) ≤ 1
For concave, monotonically non-increasing fx and fz, we know that (detailed in
the long version[?]):
fx(d1)− fx(0)
fx(d1 + d2)− fx(d1) ≤
d1
d2
and
fz(d2)− fz(0)
fz(d1 + d2)− fz(d2) ≤
d2
d1
But then, at least one of d1d2 or
d2
d1
is less than or equal to 1, which means that at
least one of ∆Ux and ∆Uz is greater than or equal to 0 and prefers a win for y
over a three-way tie. By the definition of Alg. 5, y will vote for this person when
he exists. Therefore, since y voted for x, we know ∆Ux ≥ 0, which concludes the
proof. ⊓⊔
Lemma 4. Assume that Alg. 5 is a Nash equilibrium for any configuration of
n−3 balls. Then for a TriadicVote among participants x < y < z in an urn with
n balls, at least one of x or z prefers a win for y over a three-way tie, so long
as they both have concave utilities.
Proof. Because of space constraints, we will only outline the proof here, leaving
the notation and algebra for Appendix A. The proof has two parts:
Part A. Suppose all balls are positioned somewhere between x and z, i.e. in
the interval [x, z]. Then, if x and z have concave utility functions, at least one
of x and z prefers a win for y over a three-way tie. The proof for this statement
is similar to the one in Lemma 3, albeit more complex.
Part B. For any configuration of n balls, moving any ball at position x left-
wards and moving any ball at position z rightwards can only increase both ∆Ux
and ∆Uz . Put another way, given any configuration, we can move all balls left
of x to x and all balls right of z to z, while only decreasing ∆Ux and ∆Uz . Once
moved in this way, the configuration of balls falls under the jurisdiction of Part
1, which states that at least one of ∆Ux and ∆Uz is greater than or equal to 0.
Therefore, the same participant in the original configuration must also have a
positive ∆U , which means he prefers a win for y over a three-way tie. ⊓⊔
For the final lemma, we require the following definition.
Definition 1. Given two urns R and S, each with n balls, number the balls in
R from left to right as r1, r2, . . . , rn and number the balls in S from left to right
as l1, l2, . . . , ln. Then R x-dominates S if
si ≤ ri for ri < x
si = ri for ri = x
si ≥ ri for ri > x
Lemma 5. Assume that Alg. 5 is a Nash equilibrium for any configuration of
n−3 balls. Then for a TriadicVote among participants x < y < z in an urn with
n balls, if y votes for z (WLOG), x does not benefit by voting strategically for z.
Proof. Our proof strategy will be to use a coupling argument. Let OPT denote
the optimal strategy for x. We consider two urns R and S. In urn R, x plays
according to Alg. 5. In urn S, x plays according to OPT, the strategy that
maximizes his expected utility. We couple the TriadicVote’s of these urns in the
following way:
1. Let r1, r2, . . . , rn denote the balls in urn R as indexed from leftmost position
to rightmost position. Let s1, s2, . . . , sn denote the balls in urn S as indexed
from leftmost position to rightmost position.
2. Then for every TriadicVote, when balls ri, rj , rk are randomly drawn from
urn R, balls si, sj , sk will be drawn from urn S.
Suppose R x-dominates S and then each undergoes a coupled TriadicVote where
balls ri < rj < rk are selected from R and si < sj < sk are selected from S.
After they vote, we show that the resulting urns R′ and S′ must still satisfy
R′ x-dominates S′. By the coupling rule, this is trivially true when 1) x is
not selected, 2) x is represented in two or more balls, and 3) x is the middle
participant. This is because x either does not vote or cannot affect the result in
these cases (remember that all other participants are voting according to Alg. 5).
The only remaining case is when x is one of the side participants (si WLOG).
In this case, rj wins in urn R since x plays according to Alg. 5 in this urn.
Suppose sj voted for sk. Then regardless of who x votes for, one of sj or sk must
win, both of which will still satisfy R′ x-dominates S′. Now suppose sj voted for
si. Then x could eliminate all three participants by voting for sk. However, by
Lemma 4 and the definition of Alg. 5, this would be suboptimal, which means
that x cannot play this strategy in urn S. Therefore, R′ x-dominates S′.
Finally, we note that before any TriadicVote’s take place, R and S are iden-
tical, i.e. R x-dominates S. Then, the winner of R must also x-dominate the
winner of S, which means that urn R is better for x in every coupled history. ⊓⊔
5 Future Directions
There are many future directions for this work.
Triadic Consensus For the algorithm itself, the primary problem that begs to be
worked on is an analysis for higher dimensional or even non-Euclidean spaces.
It is an open question whether Triadic Consensus achieves low communication
complexity for general preference profiles and whether it has nice properties of
convergence. The authors believe that there is something interesting that can
be said here. Similarly, it would also be exciting to extend the work on quasi-
truthfulness to higher dimensional spaces. The authors do not believe that a
naive extension will suffice; however, it seems possible that probabilistic strate-
gies coupled with other punishments for manipulation will be able to achieve
this goal.
Truthful voting rules When participants are voters and candidates, we have
indicated that manipulation can often be detected. It would be interesting to
use this idea, possibly along with the theme of triads, quasi-truthfulness, and
cyclic preferences, to design truthful voting rules. For example, one could imagine
the following variant of the Borda count: for each of the
(
n
3
)
triads, add one point
to the score of the winner10.
10 The Borda count is equivalent to giving the winner two points, the next highest
scoring participant one point, and the loser zero points.
Communication complexity Another exciting problem is to make new approxi-
mate and randomized voting rules that have low communication complexity. In
particular, it would be useful to have a voting rule where the maximum number
of comparisons per voter is small (say, O(log n)). In Triadic Consensus, only the
average number of comparisons is small, which may still prevent it from being
widely applicable to large internet crowdsourcing applications.
Consensus mechanisms On the direction of group consensus mechanisms, one
possible extension of this work is to bring it outside of voting. Namely, rather
than having the randomly selected triads vote, it would be interesting to analyze
other sorts of dynamics that are more collaborative or game-theoretic.
Urn voting rules It would also be interesting to study generalized urn voting
rules. This could include different ball replacement schemes or even more elab-
orate generalizations. For example, balls could be labeled with participant and
proposal ids so that only proposal ids are changed after a TriadicVote. Such
urn voting rules are interesting because they can be interpreted as local deci-
sions made by small groups of people and also provide a natural framework for
studying (non-trivial) probabilistic voting rules.
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A Proof of Lemma 4
We restate Lemma 4 here for the convenience of the reader.
Lemma 6. Assume that Alg. 5 is a Nash equilibrium for any configuration of
n−3 balls. Then for a TriadicVote among participants x < y < z in an urn with
n balls, at least one of x or z prefers a win for y over a three-way tie, so long
as they both have concave utilities.
As described in Section 4, this proof will be broken up into two parts, which we
will prove below. Each of these lemmas assume the inductive hypothesis that
Alg. 5 is a Nash equilibrium for any configuration of n− 3 balls.
A.1 Preliminaries
Let P denote the urn resulting from a win for y and Q denote the urn resulting
from a three-way tie. P has n balls, while Q has n− 3 balls.
Index the balls in urn P as b1, b2, . . . , bn from the leftmost participant position
to the rightmost and let the balls in urnQ be indexed identically. Let bl, bl+1, bl+2
denote the three balls in urn P that are not in urn Q, so that urn Q has balls
b1, . . . , bl−1, bl+3, . . . , bn. Note that these three balls can be indexed consecutively
because all of these missing balls are at the same location (participant y).
For each ball bi, there is some probability that the ball wins in urn P and
some probability that the ball wins in urn Q.11 Since bl, bl+1, bl+2 don’t exist in
urn Q, their probability of winning there is simply 0.
Let ∆p(bi) = Pr[bi wins in urn P ]−Pr[bi wins in urn Q].
We will use Ux(bi) to denote the utility of a bi win for x. As before, Ux(bi) =
fx(d(x, bi)). If fx is concave, then x is said to have a concave utility function.
Let UPx denote the expected utility for x from quasi-truthful voting in urn P .
Finally, we use ∆Ux = U
P
x − UQx to denote the difference in expected utility in
quasi-truthful voting for urn P and compared to urn Q.
With this notation, our proof essentially boils down to proving that at least
one of∆Ux ≥ 0 or∆Uz ≥ 0 holds. We start with a Lemma which we will need for
the further arguments. Roughly speaking, it states that there is an interval from
a ball on participant y to the median ball for which the probability of winning
in P is greater than Q. All balls outside this interval have a lower probability of
winning in P than in Q.
Lemma 7. Suppose Triadic Consensus is run on the urns P and Q. Then for
quasi-truthful voting,
∆p(bi) > 0 if min(l, n/2) ≤ i ≤ max(l + 2, n/2)
∆p(bi) < 0 otherwise
Proof. Recall that ∆p(bi) = Pr[bi wins in urn P ]−Pr[bi wins in urn Q]. From
Theorem 3, we have that a quasi-truthful strategy in urns P and Q give,
Pr[bi wins in urn P ] =
(
1
2
)n−1(
n− 1
i− 1
)
Pr[bi wins in urn Q] =


(
1
2
)n−4 (n−4
i−1
)
if i ≤ l− 1(
1
2
)n−4 (n−4
i−4
)
if i ≥ l+ 3
0 if i = l, l+ 1, l+ 2
Note that for i < l,
∆p(bi) =
(
1
2
)n−1 [
(n− 1)!
(i− 1)!(n− i)! − 8
(n− 4)!
(i− 1)!(n− i − 3)!
]
=
(
1
2
)n−1
(n− 4)!
(i − 1)!(n− i)! [(n− 1)(n− 2)(n− 3)− 8(n− i)(n− i− 1)(n− i − 2)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
f(i)
11 Technically, it is not clear what it means for one ball in position p to win over another
ball in position p; we let the winning probability of the i-th ball of n total balls be
∝ (n−1
i−1
)
since this is convenient and still produces the correct participant winning
probabilities.
Since f(i) is monotonically increasing in i, then by observing that f
(
n
2 − 1
)
< 0
and f
(
n
2
)
> 0, we have
∆p(bi) is
{
< 0 if i < min(l, n/2)
> 0 if n/2 ≤ i < l
Similarly, for i > l+ 2, we can use an analogous argument (or apply symmetry)
to claim that,
∆p(bi) is
{
< 0 if i > max(l + 2, n/2)
> 0 if l+ 2 < i ≤ n/2
Finally, it is clear that ∆p(bi) > 0 for i = l, l+ 1, l+ 2, so we are done.
A.2 Part A: If all bi lie in [x, z]
Lemma 8. Assume that the inductive hypothesis holds for n − 3. Then for a
TriadicVote among participants x < y < z in an urn with n balls, each of which
lie in [x, z], at least one of x or z prefers a win for y over a three-way tie, so
long as they both have concave utilities.
Recall that our lemma boils down to proving that at least one of ∆Ux ≥ 0 and
∆Uz ≥ 0 is true. Since the proof is very notation heavy, we first sketch the proof
with an example.
Example 5. Let P be an urn with five balls: b1 is located at position x; b2, b3,
and b4 are located at position y; and b5 is located at position z. Then urn Q is
an urn with the two balls b1 and b5.
We know (see Theorem 3) that for balls b1, b2, b3, b4, and b5,Pr[bi wins in urn P ]
is 116 ,
4
16 ,
6
16 ,
4
16 , and
1
16 respectively; Pr[bi wins in urn Q] is
1
2 , 0, 0, 0, and
1
2 , re-
spectively; which means that ∆p(bi) is − 716 , 416 , 616 , 416 , and − 716 , respectively.
Then,
∆Ux = ∆p(b1)Ux(b1) +
[
4∑
i=2
∆p(bi)Ux(bi)
]
+∆p(b5)Ux(b5)
= − 7
16
fx(d(x, x)) +
14
16
fx(d(x, y)) − 7
16
fx(d(x, z))
= − 7
16
[fx(d(x, x)) − fx(d(x, y))] − 7
16
[fx(d(x, z)) − fx(d(x, y))]
Since 716 [fx(d(x, x)) − fx(d(x, y))] ≥ 0, we have that
∆Ux ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
− 716 [fx(d(x, z))− fx(d(x, y))]
− 716 [fx(d(x, x)) − fx(d(x, y))]
≥ 1
Using similar arguments and the fact that 716 [fz(d(z, x)) − fz(d(z, y))] ≤ 0, we
have that
∆Uz ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
− 716 [fz(d(z, z))− fz(d(z, y))]
− 716 [fz(d(z, x))− fz(d(z, y))]
≤ 1
By concavity and Lemma 10 in Appendix B,
fx(d(x, z))− fx(d(x, y))
fx(d(x, x)) − fx(d(x, y)) ≥
(z − x)− (y − x)
(x− x) − (y − x) =
z − y
x− y
=
(z − z)− (z − y)
(z − x)− (z − y) ≥
fz(d(z, z))− fz(d(z, y))
fz(d(z, x))− fz(d(z, y))
This means that if z−yx−y ≥ 1, then∆Ux ≥ 0. Otherwise, if z−yx−y ≤ 1, then∆Uz ≥ 0.
Obviously, one of these must be true, so we are done for this example.
Proof. We will now prove our lemma for the general case. The argument struc-
ture is exactly the same. Let A = min(l, n/2) and Z = max(l + 2, n/2). Recall
that these are the leftmost and rightmost balls for which ∆p(bi) > 0. All other
balls must have ∆p(bi) < 0. Then we can separate the expression for ∆Ux into
three summations,
∆Ux =
A−1∑
i=1
∆p(bi)Ux(bi) +
Z∑
i=A
∆p(bi)Ux(bi) +
n∑
i=Z+1
∆p(bi)Ux(bi)
Note that
∑A−1
i=1 ∆p(bi) +
∑n
i=Z+1∆p(bi) = −
∑Z
i=A∆p(bi). Then we can par-
tition up the mass of ∆p(bj) so that we can get one-to-one correspondence of
masses corresponding to j ∈ [A,Z] and j 6∈ [A,Z]. Let the masses corresponding
to i = 1, 2, . . . , A−1 be denoted by p1, p2, . . . , pu and let the masses correspond-
ing to Z1, Z2, . . . , n be denoted by q1, q2, . . . , qv. In other words, p1...u, q1...v are
chosen so that
∑A−1
i=1 ∆p(bi) =
∑u
i=1 pi,
∑n
i=Z+1∆p(bi) =
∑v
i=1 qi, and
∆Ux =
u∑
i=1
pi[Ux(bg1(i))− Ux(bh1(i))] +
v∑
i=1
qi[Ux(bg2(i))− Ux(bh2(i))]
where g1 : [1..u] → [1..A − 1], g2 : [1..v] → [Z + 1..n], h1 : [1..u] → [A..Z], and
h2 : [1..v]→ [A..Z].
Note that since balls are indexed left to right and all lie within [x, z], then
balls indexed i ∈ [1, A) (e.g. bg1(·)) are closer to x than those indexed i ∈ [A,Z]
(e.g. bh1(·) and bh2(·)), which are closer than those indexed i ∈ (R, n] (e.g. bg2(·)).
Therefore, we have
Ux(bg1(i))− Ux(bh1(i)) ≥ 0 and Ux(bg2(i))− Ux(bh2(i)) ≤ 0
Combining these, we get that
∆Ux ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
∑u
i=1 pi[Ux(bg1(i))− Ux(bh1(i))]∑v
i=1 qi[Ux(bh2(i))− Ux(bg2(i))]
≥ 1 (1)
since qi[Ux(bh2(i))− Ux(bg2(i))] ≥ 0. Similarly, we have
∆Uz =
u∑
i=1
pi[Uz(bg1(i))− Uz(bh1(i))] +
v∑
i=1
qi[Uz(bg2(i))− Uz(bh2(i))]
For z, balls indexed i ∈ [1, A) (e.g. bg1(·)) are farther from z than those indexed
i ∈ [A,Z] (e.g. bh1(·) and bh2(·)), which are farther than those indexed i ∈ (R, n]
(e.g. bg2(·)). Therefore,
Uz(bg1(i))− Uz(bh1(i)) ≤ 0 and Uz(bg2(i))− Uz(bh2(i)) ≥ 0
Combining these, we get that
∆Uz ≥ 0 ⇐⇒
∑u
i=1 pi[Uz(bg1(i))− Uz(bh1(i))]∑v
i=1 qi[Uz(bh2(i))− Uz(bg2(i))]
≤ 1 (2)
since qi[Uz(bh2(i))− Uz(bg2(i))] ≤ 0.
We now have one last step. For any f(x) which is concave and monotonically
decreasing, we have that
m∑
i=1
ci[f(t
2
i )− f(t1i )]
n∑
j=1
dj [f(s2j)− f(s1j)]
≥
m∑
i=1
ci[t
2
i − t1i ]
n∑
j=1
dj [s2j − s1j ]
and
m∑
i=1
ci[f(s
1
i )− f(s2i )]
n∑
j=1
dj [f(t1j)− f(t2j)]
≤
m∑
i=1
ci[s
1
i − s2i ]
n∑
j=1
dj [t1j − t2j ]
for s1j ≤ t1i , s2j ≤ t2i , s1i ≤ s2j , t1i ≤ t2i , and sign(ci) = sign(dj) (as detailed in
Appendix B). Applying this to (1) and (2), we get
∑u
i=1 pi[Ux(bg1(i))− Ux(bh1(i))]∑v
i=1 qi[Ux(bh2(i))− Ux(bg2(i))]
≤
∑u
i=1 pi[d(x, bg1(i))− d(x, bh1(i))]∑v
i=1 qi[d(x, bh2(i))− d(x, bg2(i))]
=
∑u
i=1 pi[−d(bg1(i), bh1(i))]∑v
i=1 qi[−d(bh2(i), bg2(i))]
and∑u
i=1 pi[Uz(bg1(i))− Uz(bh1(i))]∑v
i=1 qi[Uz(bh2(i))− Uz(bg2(i))]
≥
∑u
i=1 pi[d(z, bg1(i))− d(z, bh1(i))]∑v
i=1 qi[d(z, bh2(i))− d(z, bg2(i))]
=
∑u
i=1 pi[d(bg1(i), bh1(i))]∑v
i=1 qi[d(bh2(i), bg2(i))]
Then either∑u
i=1 pi[d(bg1(i), bh1(i))]∑v
i=1 qi[d(bh2(i), bg2(i))]
≥ 1 or
∑u
i=1 pi[d(bg1(i), bh1(i))]∑v
i=1 qi[d(bh2(i), bg2(i))]
≤ 1
If the first is true, we can apply (1) to claim that ∆Ux ≥ 0. If the second is
true, we can apply (2) to claim that ∆Uz ≥ 0. Since one of these must be true,
we are done.
A.3 Part B: Moving balls into the interval [x, z] only decreases
∆Ux and ∆Uz
Lemma 9. Consider urns P and Q. From P , create a new urn P ′ by moving
all balls left of x to x and all balls right of z to z. Similarly, from Q, create a
new urn Q′ by moving all balls left of x to x and all balls right of z to z. Let
∆p′(bi) = Pr[bi wins in urn P ′]−Pr[bi wins in urn Q′] and ∆U ′x = UP
′
x −UQ
′
x .
Then,
∆Ux ≥ ∆U ′x and ∆Uz ≥ ∆U ′z
Proof. Since the relative positions of the balls have not changed in P ′ and Q′, the
change in winning probabilities from P ′ to Q′ are the same, i.e.∆p(bi) = ∆p′(bi).
Then for ∆p(bi) < 0,
∆p(bi)Ux(bi) ≥ ∆p′(bi)U ′x(bi) ⇐⇒ Ux(bi) ≤ U ′x(bi)
⇐⇒ bi is moved closer to x
and for ∆p(bi) > 0,
∆p(bi)Ux(bi) ≥ ∆p′(bi)U ′x(bi) ⇐⇒ Ux(bi) ≥ U ′x(bi)
⇐⇒ bi is moved farther from x
Likewise, the same statements hold when x is replaced with z. Then we can use
this to prove our Lemma by splitting it up into three cases:
Case 1: bn/2 ∈ [x, z] for urn P When the median ball is located in [x, z], we
know from Lemma 7 that all balls left of x and right of z satisfy ∆p(bi) < 0.
Then moving the balls left of x to x brings them closer to both x and z. Similarly,
moving the balls right of z to z brings them closer to both x and z. Therefore,
we must have
∆Ux =
n∑
i=1
∆p(bi)Ux(bi) ≥
n∑
i=1
∆p′(bi)U ′x = ∆U
′
x
and similarly, ∆Uz ≥ ∆U ′z.
Case 2: bn/2 < x for urn P When the median ball is located to the left of x, we
will need to first make an intermediate pair of urns. Note that the balls left of
bn/2 have ∆p(bi) < 0 so we can move them rightwards to bring them closer to
both x and z. However, since the balls between bn/2 and x have ∆p(bi) > 0, we
need to move them leftwards to bring them farther away from both x and z. For
the balls right of z, ∆p(bi) < 0, so we can again move them to z which brings
them closer to x and z. We will denote these movements with the intermediate
urns P ′′ and Q′′. In these urns, all the balls left of x are moved to the position
bn/2 and all the balls right of z are moved to z. By an argument similar to that
of Case 1, ∆Ux ≥ ∆U ′′x and ∆Uz ≥ ∆U ′′z . Now, note that
∆U ′′x =
[
k−1∑
i=1
∆p′′(bi)
]
U ′′x (bn/2) +
n∑
i=k
∆p′′(bi)U ′′x (bi)
where k is the index of the leftmost ball that is right of x and U ′′, p′′ are the
analogous expressions for utility and winning probability in urns P ′′, Q′′. But
we also know that for k < l,
k−1∑
i=1
∆p′′(bi) =
k−1∑
i=1
[(
1
2
)n−1(
n− 1
i− 1
)
−
(
1
2
)n−4(
n− 4
i− 1
)]
= Pr[≤ k − 2 heads in n− 1 coin flips]−Pr[≤ k − 2 heads in n− 4 coin flips] ≤ 0
Then this means that[
k−1∑
i=1
∆p′′(bi)
]
U ′′x (bn/2) ≥
[
k−1∑
i=1
∆p′(bi)
]
U ′x(bn/2) ⇐⇒ U ′′x (bn/2 ≤ U ′x(bn/2)
⇐⇒ bn/2 is moved closer to x
where the same statements hold when x is replaced by z. We can now moving
the balls at the position of ball bn/2 rightwards to x to create the final urns P
′
and Q′. When we do so, we are bringing all the balls closer to both x and z,
which we just showed must decrease ∆U ′′x and ∆U
′′
z . Then ∆U
′
x ≤ ∆U ′′x ≤ Ux
and ∆U ′z ≤ ∆U ′′z ≤ Uz, which concludes our proof for this case.
Case 3: bn/2 > z for urn P The proof is symmetric to that of Case 2.
B Supporting Proofs
Theorem 8. [20] Let a fixed size urn with R0 red balls out of n total balls have
an urn function f(p) for which f(p)f(1−p) is monotonically decreasing and let T
denote the first time when either RT = n or RT = 0. Then,
E[T ] ≤ 1
q1
+
⌊n
2
⌋−1∑
k=1
qk
qk+1(qk − pk)
where pk = f
(
n−k
n
)
and qk = f
(
k
n
)
.
Corollary 2. Let a fixed size urn with R0 red balls out of n total balls have
an urn function f(p) = 3p(1 − p)2 and let T denote the first time when either
RT = n or RT = 0. Then,
E[τ ] ≤ n lnn+O(n)
Proof. From Theorem 8, we know that
E[T ] ≤ 1
q1
+
⌊n
2
⌋−1∑
k=1
qk
qk+1(qk − pk) =
n3
3(n− 1)2 +
n3
3
⌊n
2
⌋−1∑
k=1
n− k
(k + 1)(n− k − 1)2(n− 2k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(∗)
where
(∗) = − 1
n(n− 2)(n− k − 1)2 +
4n
(n+ 2)(n− 2)2(n− 2k)
+
n+ 1
n2(n+ 2)(k + 1)
− n
2 + n− 2
n2(n− 2)2(n− k − 1)
≤ 4n
(n+ 2)(n− 2)2(n− 2k) +
n+ 1
n2(n+ 2)(k + 1)
=
(
4
n2(n− 2k) +
1
n2(k + 1)
)(
1 +O
(
1
n
))
Putting it together, we have
E[T ] ≤ n
3
+ o(1) +
n
3
(
1 +O
(
1
n
)) ⌊n
2
⌋−1∑
k=1
[
4
n− 2k +
1
k + 1
]
Noting that
∑k
i=1
1
k = Hk = lnn+O(1), whereHk is the k-th Harmonic number,
we have
E[T ] ≤ O(n) + n
3
(
2 ln
n
2
+ ln
n
2
)
= n lnn+O(n)
Lemma 10. Let f(x) be a concave monotonically decreasing function. Then
for s1j , s
2
j , t
1
i , t
2
i ∈ R satisfying s1j ≤ t1i , s2j ≤ t2i , s1i ≤ s2j , and t1i ≤ t2i and
sign(ci) = sign(dj), we have
m∑
i=1
ci[f(t
2
i )− f(t1i )]
n∑
j=1
dj [f(s2j)− f(s1j)]
≥
m∑
i=1
ci[t
2
i − t1i ]
n∑
j=1
dj [s2j − s1j ]
and
m∑
i=1
ci[f(s
1
i )− f(s2i )]
n∑
j=1
dj [f(t1j)− f(t2j)]
≤
m∑
i=1
ci[s
1
i − s2i ]
n∑
j=1
dj [t1j − t2j ]
Proof. Since f is concave, s1j ≤ t1i , and s2j ≤ t2i ,
f(t2i )− f(t1i )
t2i − t1i
≤ f(t
2
i )− f(s1j)
t2i − s1j
≤ f(s
2
j)− f(s1j)
s2j − s1j
Then by noting that f is monotonically decreasing, s1j ≤ s2j , t1i ≤ t2i , and
sign(ci) = sign(dj), we achieve the statement for a single term on the top and
bottom
ci[f(t
2
i )− f(t1i )]
dj [f(s2j)− f(s1j)]
≥ ci[t
2
i − t1i ]
dj [s2j − s1j ]
If we flip this inequality, we get
dj [f(s
2
j)− f(s1j)]
ci[f(t2i )− f(t1i )]
≤ dj [s
2
j − s1j ]
ci[t2i − t1i ]
Using this, we can derive,
n∑
j=1
dj [f(s
2
j)− f(s1j)]
ci[f(t2i )− f(t1i )]
=
n∑
j=1
dj [f(s
2
j)− f(s1j)]
ci[f(t2i )− f(t1i )]
≤
n∑
j=1
dj [s
2
j − s1j ]
ci[t2i − t1i ]
=
n∑
j=1
dj [s
2
j − s1j ]
ci[t2i − t1i ]
Then by flipping this inequality, we get
ci[f(t
2
i )− f(t1i )]
n∑
j=1
dj [f(s2j)− f(s1j)]
≥ ci[t
2
i − t1i ]
n∑
j=1
dj [s2j − s1j ]
Finally, we can use this to derive the first part of our final result
m∑
i=1
ci[f(t
2
i )− f(t1i )]
n∑
j=1
dj [f(s2j)− f(s1j)]
=
m∑
i=1
ci[f(t
2
i )− f(t1i )]
n∑
j=1
dj [f(s2j )− f(s1j)]
≥
m∑
i=1
ci[t
2
i − t1i ]
n∑
j=1
dj [s2j − s1j ]
=
m∑
i=1
ci[t
2
i − t1i ]
n∑
j=1
dj [s2j − s1j ]
We can get the second part by simply inverting and multiplying the top and
bottom of both sides by −1
n∑
j=1
dj [f(s
2
j)− f(s1j)]
m∑
i=1
ci[f(t2i )− f(t1i )]
≤
n∑
j=1
dj [s
2
j − s1j ]
m∑
i=1
ci[t2i − t1i ]
